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The resurrection of essentialist arguments, in the context of the modern evolutionary synthesis, high-
lights the need for a break from historical definitions of ‘kind’ and ‘essence’ in order to bring a new 
paradigm in which these terms are used to conceptualise and understand evolutionary processes. 
The definition of ‘essence’ is herein divided into two distinct parts, namely the structural essence, 
which is mutable and has an evolutionary context; and the character essence, which is the immut-
able spatio-temporal expression of the structural essence of an individual. In contrast, the ‘kind’ is 
herein redefined as a region within a wider phylogenetically constrained organism state that reflects 
a conflux of character essences that form an immutable semaphoront. This organism state enables 
the hypothetical delineation of spatio-temporally immutable forms, called species, which are drawn 
from an evolutionary continuum. These revised definitions and the taxonomic clades derived from 
them determine the species that are used in the construction of phylogenies that reflect true historical 
and evolutionary relationships between organisms. The use of integrated taxonomy allows taxono-
mists to choose the appropriate concept enabling the evolutionary significance of the organism to be 
explained. This refocuses the argument from the concept back to the criteria, but often at the cost of 
causal explanation or conceptional explicitness. While integrated taxonomy allows the taxonomist 
the freedom to delineate species outside of any rigid conceptual framework, we seek to apply to this 
freedom a limit to the understanding of the evolutionary potential of an organism through the framing 
of that organism in a fixed spatio-temporal point. We call this confined potential the ‘essence matrix’, 
and it is these boundaries of this matrix that define the evolutionary potential of past and future forms, 
as well as define and restrict the field of morphospace upon which convergence and reticulation of 
taxa can occur. We name this limitation on evolutionary potential, the essentialist arguments used 
to construct it, and the integrated taxonomic approach to criteria selection, ‘essentialistic pluralism’. 
Finally, we will examine the complexity of species demarcation, noting the continuing failure for 
explicitness in conceptual application even if criteria are obvious. 
INTRODUCTION
The natural world is classically ordered according 
to hierarchical relationships that are constructed in 
a manner that does not reflect modern evolutionary 
principles and the new biological essentialist para-
digm. The historical pursuit of inferring the natural 
relationships between organisms is primarily a by-
product of human intellectual inquisitiveness and 
reflects a pseudo-theological search for understanding 
the natural order of life, a quest that has challenged 
philosophers and those interested in the sciences 
before the Common Era (Henry, 2011; Lewis, 1963). 
As scientific understanding and shifts in theological 
influence have changed over time, so too have the 
processes and doctrines underpinning methodical 
approaches among those disciplines concerned with 
finding an optimal system of nomenclature similarly 
changed (Moritz, 2013). 
The shift from theocratic creationism towards an 
evolutionary necessity in taxonomy has challenged the 
hierarchical orthodoxy conceptualised and instituted 
by Linné (1735, 1758). This challenge has led to con-
flict and a rigorous defence of systems of nomenclature 
based on personal ideology rather than theoretical 
optimisation (Brummitt, 2002; Cantino et al., 1999). 
Irrespective of the ideological stance taken, any system 
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of nomenclature needs to impart a sense of ontology, or 
reality, as well as to possess an inherent epistemology 
that enables a delineation of how derived taxonomic 
conceptional entities reflect the taxonomic needs of the 
classifier (Szalay & Bock, 1991). Consequently, taxono-
mists are drawn towards particular taxonomic schools 
of thought based on their personal understanding of 
evolutionary theory, taxonomical needs and predis-
position towards an ideological stance on a particular 
taxonomic or species concept (Cracraft, 1987). 
In order to re-engage the wider scientific com-
munity in the species debate, there needs to be an 
accep tance that the term ‘species’ has fundamen-
tally differing meanings (Schlick-Steiner et al., 2019). 
The use of integrated taxonomy, with its unrestricted 
 approach to conceptualisation of what is a  species, 
 allows the taxonomist the freedom to express a unique 
approach to exploring phylogeny without the  shackles 
of rigid neces sity to declare adherence to a single 
 species concept (Yeates et al., 2011; Pavan & Marrioig, 
2016; Solari et al., 2019; Pardo-Diaz et al., 2019). The 
broader scien tific community can be brought back to 
the  species  debate only when there is an acceptance that 
there is no correct or incorrect conceptuality in species 
definition, with all proposed species concepts theoreti-
cally having a usefulness (Schlick-Steiner et al., 2019). 
Many scientists have avoided species debates in evolu-
tionary biology as a consequence of the  semantics sur-
rounding many of the current issues (Noor, 2002; Pante 
et al., 2015). Much of this avoidance can also be attri-
buted to conceptual mis understandings and  ignorance 
of the theoretical basis for what actually constitutes 
a species. The broader scientific community can be 
brought back to the  species debate only when there is 
an acceptance that because they are hypothetical there 
is no correct or incorrect conceptuality in species defi-
nition, with all proposed species concepts theoretically 
having usefulness (Hausdorf, 2011).
Species need to be conceptualised outside of taxo-
nomic classificatory systems as they fall outside of sys-
tematic hierarchical arguments, being funda mentally 
hypothetical (Dubois, 2011). Although hypothetical in 
nature, a species hypothesis is represented by a set of 
real organisms. Thus, because species are real  entities 
and not just intentional meanings derived by the taxon-
omist, they differ innately from higher classifications 
which are subjective in that there is no physical rep-
resentation of the hypothetical rank (Ghiselin, 1974; 
Hull, 1976). This raises a point of contention: if species 
are real, why are many of the concepts that are used 
to define them based on unreal or non-causal  criteria? 
This leads to a complexity in conceptual realisa tion 
and invariably to conceptual misunderstanding, a 
prob lem again absent in higher taxonomic arguments 
that have no physical reality (Stamos, 2003). There is 
a need for criteria to give a sense of a touchstone to 
the real.
One of the problems with engaging a taxonomist 
in the species conceptual debate is that they are often 
at a loss to explain their meaning of species, falling 
into the trap of conceptual adherence and associ-
ated  rhetoric and overlooking the hypothetical nature 
of the reference point in nature they seek to demar-
cate. Such rigidity to a conceptual belief invariably 
ends with the taxonomist at a loss when faced with 
contra-arguments (Hey, 2001). This adherence to 
a conceptual framework also loses sight of the pri-
mary mission of the taxonomist, which is, according 
to Mayden (1999, p. 115), “to discover, describe, and 
classify biological diversity, regardless of how much 
there may really be out there”. It is also irrational for 
a taxonomist to bind him/herself to any concept due 
to its convenience in application or acceptance by the 
wider collective scientific community (Nadachowski, 
1993). Further, the long-term species debate has failed 
to enunciate the significance of the nuances of the 
species concept applied by the practising biologist. 
The application of species concepts is used to make 
critical decisions that affect universal biodiversity and 
macroecological assessments, as well as provide the 
support for evolutionary understanding in fields well 
apart from the narrow frame of their activities (Hey 
et al., 2003; Tan et al., 2008; Naomi, 2011; Frankham, 
et al. 2012). This has never been more relevant than 
in contemporary taxonomic practice, with the rise of 
conservation-orientated systematic arguments which 
seek to limit the ability of the taxonomist to under-
take wide-ranging revisions, with such revisions seen 
as a threat to global diversity (Garnett & Christidis, 
2017; Thomson et al., 2018; Gangloff, 2019).
Taxonomic descriptions of new species are often 
fundamentally flawed as there is generally no explicit 
statement of the species concept used to delineate 
the taxon (Tan et al., 2008). This lack of conceptual 
explicitness leads invariably to three primary errors 
in the systematic demarcation of species:
1) Type I errors occur when there has been an 
overestimation of the number of species within 
a particular organism complex;
2) Type II errors occur when the number of species 
in the organism complex has been underesti-
mated; and 
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3) Type III errors occur when there has been a mis-
representation of the systematic relationships 
between the organisms within the complex 
(Adams, 1998). This has serious implications 
for understanding evolutionary history, where 
“irrational” species could lead to a misrepre-
sentation of the evolutionary progression of a 
clade (Adams, 1998), or in the conservation of 
endangered organisms (Garnett & Christidis, 
2017). 
When determining a species, a taxonomist has 
an obligation to nominate the species conceptual 
approach being followed, to ensure a clear understand-
ing of the criteria that are necessary and sufficient to 
determine the population (Hausdorf, 2011). The need 
for explicitness in criteria brings the theoretical prob-
lem of species recognition back within the scope of 
the rules of nomenclature that govern the application 
of names (Knapp, 2008). In addition, the taxonomist 
has an obligation to inform on the actual process of 
speciation that has taken place, giving insight into the 
ontology and causation of organismic differentiation 
(Miller, 2001; Losos & Glor, 2003). The use of inte-
grated taxonomy enables the taxonomist the freedom 
to choose species criteria that are most appropriate for 
the set of organisms, irrespective of definitions that 
may have been applied to their sister taxa. However, 
this freedom in descriptive modality needs to be 
 coupled with conception explicitness, that is, not just 
state the method used to discriminate a taxon, but 
answer the causal question as well.
In this paper, we redefine ‘biological essential-
ism’ through the differentiation of the two concepts 
of ‘kind’ and ‘essence’ that have become erroneously 
synonymised in modern evolutionary theory. In addi-
tion, we will demonstrate that a ‘kind’ is a part of 
an organism state, which is a fixed, discrete entity 
within a spatio-temporal framework that is defined by 
essences. The edges of the organism state represent 
the phylogenetically constrained boundaries of an 
organism at a particular point in time. Further, we will 
consider the pluralist approach to understanding what 
constitutes an ‘essence’, that is, the integrative taxo-
nomic freedom to determine the criteria or species 
delimitation, and specifically describe two discrete 
forms of essence, namely the ‘character essence’ 
(Box 1), which is a spatio-temporally fixed character, 
and the ‘structural essence’ (Box 1), which is mutable 
and has an evolutionary context, a distinction that has 
yet to be fully explored within the literature. We pre-
sent the ‘essence matrix’, which confines the organism 
state to a discrete boundary of evolutionary poten-
tial for an organism to reticulate and evolve within 
through time. Further, this paper will demonstrate 
that essentialistic pluralism is a standard for univer-
sality and addresses the need of species demarcation 
at its core: what is the intended meaning imparted by 
naming an organism and not just the criteria used to 
describe and differentiate it?
ESSENTIALIST TAXONOMY
Essentialism has a valuable role to play in provid-
ing an understanding of evolutionary processes as it 
explains the evolution of both the intrinsic and extrin-
sic natures of taxa (Walsh, 2006). Understanding the 
dualistic nature of taxa requires an acceptance of 
the evolutionary reality that organisms evolve sub-
ordinate monophyletic groups that have an ancestry 
determined by the linking of real organism states 
(Box 1) and not some evolutionary ideology (Brundin, 
1972). Organism states are, in turn, defined by ‘kinds’ 
(Box 1), which are created by the congruence of 
‘structural essences’ (Box 1).
BOX 1. Glossary of new and revised significant taxonomic terms.
Organism state: The phylogenetically constrained boundary of all potentially expressed essences that a biological 
population (considered a species) exhibits at a static point in its spatio-temporal evolution, that is, a holomorph.
Kind: A region within an organism state that represents a conflux of an organism’s structural essences, and 
reflects the nature of an organism at a point in its evolutionary progression; an immutable semaphoront.
Structural essence: An evolutionary trait that may represent a phenotypically plastic form, or an ecological 
boundary, which defines an intrinsic or extrinsic aspect of the organism.
Character essence: The immutable attribute of an individual that reflect a spatio-temporal expression of 
structural essences.
Essence matrix: The entire collection of structural essences that unifies the ancestral and descendant taxa and 
is used to define the higher clade from which an organism state has evolved, and bounds that organism’s potential 
for evolutionary divergnce in form into the future.
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 ‘Kind’ and ‘essence’ have often been used inter-
changeably although they are different concepts. 
Consequently, they have been maligned in the argu-
ments against immutability that have been used 
to support the drive towards neo-Darwinism and 
the modern evolutionary synthesis (Mayr, 1987; 
Amundson, 1998; Okasha, 2002). There has been 
considerable debate on the nature of what actually con-
stitutes an ‘essence’. We make six observations. First, 
historically, to taxonomists such as Linné, the term 
essence simply meant that which is taxonomically 
useful (Winsor, 2006). Second, many contemporary 
essentialist arguments are pseudo-Aristotelian, based 
on either shared salient morphology, or innate intrin-
sic properties that have explicit and rigid taxonomic 
meaning (Wallace, 2002; Oderberg, 2007). Third, 
the essence of an organism has also been linked to its 
genotype, which is then expressed in the observable 
morphological, physiological or behavioural charac-
ters it displays (Kitts & Kitts, 1979). Fourth, the 
genotypical approach has been further refined into the 
extended phenetical approach, where the definition 
of essence includes ancestry and relational biology 
(Walsh, 2006; Elder, 2008). Fifth, the more minimalist 
approach to defining the essence, based on a character 
trait, is outside historical necessity and is not intrin-
sic to the definition of an individual (Dumsday, 2012). 
Finally, in contrast, the phylogenetic approach seeks 
to shift the focus of essentialism from a categori-
cal basis to a more historical one, thus enabling the 
essence to be used in evolutionary biology through 
the incorporation of intrinsic with extrinsic, or rela-
tional essences as part of a wider holistic view of the 
organism (Devitt, 2010; Dumsday, 2012). Irrespective 
of the approach taken to defining the essence, one of 
the failings of these theories is the inability to differ-
entiate between two distinctive essence forms, namely 
the structural and character essences.
The structural essences of an organism state arise 
from the collective essence matrix, which defines the 
morpho-space of inclusivity of the higher taxonomy 
to which the organism, in all possible phenotypically 
plastic forms and ecological boundaries, belongs. 
This organism state can be viewed simply as the 
boundary of a species’ variability at an exact point 
in space and time; that is, a species is a fixed cross-
section of a continuum chosen by the taxonomist to 
give a reference point to advance an explanation of the 
observable natural world. In contrast, the character 
essences are the immutable attributes of an individual 
and the spatio-temporal expression of the structural 
essences at the point at which the species is circum-
scribed. Importantly, it is the character essences of a 
taxon that are used to provide the restricted definition 
of the kind within the broader organism state and are 
used to formulate the diagnosis of a species.
In the current essentialist debate, the concept 
of a ‘kind’ refers to an immutable form and is not 
linked to a particular end point in the hierarchical 
tree  typology. Therefore, it is theoretically in correct 
to refer to  species in the classical sense in terms of 
discrete classes of natural kinds with an implicit 
immutability. Rather, species should be viewed as 
distinct representatives along a continuum, thus being 
evolutionarily plastic, rather than temporally variable. 
Kinds need to be viewed in terms of a convergence 
of structural essence axes within the organism matrix 
that enables the discernment of a collective type with 
an explicit taxonomic definition, albeit at the arbi-
trary judgement of the taxonomist (Forey, 2002). 
In this context, kinds represent the collection of units 
of change within an organism state that results from 
the subjective assessment of the unbroken chain of 
divergence (Dobzhansky, 1935). The kind forms a 
statement of evolutionary position chosen by the 
taxono mist to reflect a more inclusive organism state 
comprised of evolving structural essences.
Mayr (1987) rejected kinds, arguing that natural 
kinds were sterile, and consequently, this termi nology 
should be restricted to inanimate objects, such as 
 metals. However, this is an incorrect assumption 
based on an innate restrictiveness and lack of histo ri-
city that has been applied to the classical definition of 
a kind. Further, Mayr’s approach is a rejection of the 
premise that species are capable of evolving, which is 
not upheld under the revised definition.
HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS OF SPECIES
Darwin (1859) argued that species are arbitrary 
constructs of convenience selected from a fluctu-
ating evolutionary pond of forms. This argument 
mirrors the belief that species are not discrete, but 
rather become indistinguishable within a merging 
metapopulation, where essences reticulate between 
individuals as populations (Lamarck, 1801). This idea 
was extended in the adaptive field theories of Wright 
(1932) and Dobzhansky (1951) in which discernment 
of taxa occurs at topological peaks of adaptational 
success. The valleys between the combination of 
genes indicate a point at which discrete organisms 
can be delineated from one another (Dobzhansky, 
1951). Species, therefore, are hypothetically derived 
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with the choice of demarcation, a decision made by 
the taxonomist.
The determination of a method to demarcate 
 species has been a complex argument that has lasted 
centuries. Species need to be contextualised as a direct 
and discernible product of evolution constructed on 
a set of unifying essences chosen by the taxonomist. 
This currently occurs under guides of a theoretical 
concept chosen by the taxonomist. It is worth noting 
that the word species senso stricto has two primary 
uses: it is used by taxonomists to delineate the forms 
within nature and create hypothetical hierarchies 
and, at the same time, it is used as a definition by 
the taxon omist to form a discernible immutable kind 
that acts as a hypothetical name-bearing  reference 
point from which the process of evolution can be de-
scribed (Mayr, 1987, 1996; Ereshefsky, 1992; Pleijel & 
Rouse, 2000). However, a species has a unique history 
and forms the more inclusive individual taxon with 
charac teristics that are often not exhibited by the kind 
(Mishler & Donaghue, 1982; Nixon and Wheeler, 
1990; Wiley, 1980). In contrast, higher taxa are 
multi dimensional, existing within a spatio- temporal 
continuum in which the shared characteristics, or 
structural essences, are acting as axes that reflect 
their unique evolutionary direction (Andersson, 1990; 
Szalay & Bock, 1991). When these axes converge, 
there is a forming of a discrete kind that can be given 
a formal definition (Dupré, 1981). Further, it is the 
relationships and clustering of these organism states 
based on shared ancestry that form the basis for the 
definition of higher taxa.
The birth of a new species, or delineation of two 
taxa, occurs in two ways. First, via the process of 
heterochronic cladogenesis, where two distinctive 
convergences arise in the organism state and the 
cleavage of new identifiable species with new identi-
fied phylogenetic constraints is deemed appropriate by 
the taxonomist (Huxley, 1957; Gould, 1977; Aze et al., 
2013). Second, via the process of anagenesis, where 
a particular set of essences consistently converge out-
side the parameters of the parental metapopulation, as 
defined by the kind, requiring a redefinition of the kind 
(Huxley, 1957; Aze et al., 2013). While the acceptance 
of stasiogenesis implies that there is no multiplication 
of species and evolutionary failure, it may also reflect 
internal reticulation of the kind that reflects a conver-
gence about a conflux of evolu tionary optimisation 
(Huxley, 1957; Crusafont-Pairó & Truylos-Santonja, 
1958; Figure 1). This reticulation has significant impli-
cations for phylogenetic reconstruction where only one 
gene has been utilised and the results may reflect only 
FIGURE 1. The use of structural essences and the organism state to illustrate how the delineation of a kind can reflect modes 
of evolutionary phylogenesis: A) cladogenic evolution, in which there are two distinctive kinds created, each with individual 
phylogenetic constraints; B) anagenic evolution, where there is a shift in the structural essence convergence giving rise to 
distinctive changes in the kind within the relatively constant phytogenetic constraints; and C) stasiogenic evolution, in which 
there is no change in the kind, illustrating also that, while the phylogenetic constraints remain relatively stable, there may 
be reticulation.
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gene evolution rather than the true state of the histori-
cal relationships between organisms. Evolution is more 
than the addition or subtraction of genetic  material, 
but rather reflects an interaction of gene systems: the 
transitional valleys between gene clusterings represent 
taxic exploration of evolutionary possibi lities rather 
than the initial stages of a genetic conflux giving rise 
to a new taxon (Dobzhansky, 1951). 
Notwithstanding the mode of speciation, there is 
a necessary need for the generation of artificial tem-
poral evolutionary stasigenesis for the delimitation 
of an organism state for the purposes of generating 
systematic understanding. This artificial stasio genesis 
introduces an explicitness into the definition of species 
that then enables the production of real propositions on 
the historicity of the evolution of organisms. Taxa are 
explicitly defined in terms of kinds to avoid ambiguity 
and facilitate effective communication of the biologi-
cal entity, reflecting the convergences of the axes even 
if these kinds are only representative of the wider, 
more-inclusive organism state (Dupré, 1981; Bryant, 
1996). In point of fact, kinds represent  nothing more 
than the adaptive peaks of an organism state.
Avise et al. (1987) highlight the complexity of 
gaining an understanding of the evolutionary sig-
nificance and determining within an organism state 
when, from the extrapolation of a number of micro-
evolutionary events, macroevolution is said to have 
occurred. Avise et al. (1987) saw macroevolutionary 
patterns as a substrate that is formed by the branches 
and twigs of intergenerational pedigrees within the 
complexity of phylogeny. One of the major theoreti-
cal standards for the delineation of a species from 
the myriad of branching possibilities is the simulta-
neous establishment of joint possession of structural 
essences, or synapomorphies, in each line (Bremer 
& Wanntorp, 1979). However, strict adherence to 
this method of differentiation has been found to be 
problematic in delineating when a novel structural 
essence, from the time of origin to fixation, gives rise 
to a new kind in a spatio-temporal organism state. 
This can be resolved by the defining of ancestry in 
terms of the absence of structural essences. However, 
the problem with this approach to the delineation of 
ancestor-descendant relationships lies in determining 
the temporal points of divergence, or when an adap-
tive peak deserves taxonomic isolation from its sister 
peaks. A particular characteristic may be more fre-
quent in one taxon than another, absent altogether, or 
cryptic; and an assumption is made by the taxonomist 
practising a level of pattern cladistics when a new 
species has arisen (Brady, 1982). If this is accepted, 
then it is the taxic homologies, which are based on 
descendants rather than transformational homologies, 
that are defining the phylogeny rather than just seek-
ing to explain the genealogy.
Taxonomists also must deal with a level of contin-
gency in delineating taxa (Chambers, 2012). There is 
a level of inference, based on evidence at hand that is 
used to generate the essences that define the organ-
ism state and then are restricted further into the kind. 
This involves a shift from a search for differences to 
an examination of commonality and the seeking of 
sub-patterns, or character essences, which form the 
conflux of axes unifying them (Kitcher 1981). The 
determination of which essences form the best guide 
to the determination of an organism state and the 
kind is a matter of relational taxonomic subjectivity 
(Okasha, 2002; Devitt, 2008). This reflects the reality 
that structural essences are innately ambiguous, com-
prised of an unknown number of transitions, possess 
an often-cryptic single origin, and may have under-
gone a level of evolutionary reversal (de Pinna, 1991). 
Therefore, the approach taken in the determination of 
a discrete kind, which represents a wider organism 
state, will be highly dependent on the species concep-
tual approach that is being utilised by the taxonomist. 
Again, it is worth noting that the conceptual approach 
to species is often restricted by a rigid adherence to 
an ideological stance that blinds the taxonomist to the 
real phylogeny. 
There is a plethora of rigid methodological ap-
proaches enabling discrimination of the kind. Many 
of these methodical approaches to species conception 
are based on the single individual and are mereologi-
cally formulated, and all have the underlying drive 
to find exclusivity in definition (Hull, 1980; Kornet, 
1993; de Pinna, 1999). This gives rise to the problem 
faced with the defining of the evolutionary unit and 
the nature of a species itself. Further, this problem can 
be reduced to one of taxonomic demarcation of in-
clusiveness once separation based on the components 
of the organism is used to aggregate and generate 
the populations (Hull, 1980). Notwithstanding the 
need for definitional exclusivity, species can also 
be considered as a set of organisms with a unique 
relation ship that forms a natural heterogeneous indi-
vidual (Kitcher,1984a; Ereshefsky, 1992). 
Irrespective of the species concept that is chosen 
by the taxonomist, there are four basic characteristics 
that must be met in order to fulfil the needs of com-
munication of the natural world. First, there needs to 
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be a reality, or an actual spatio-temporal existence, 
even if this is unobservable (Cracraft, 1987). Second, 
the species needs to have a level of individualisa-
tion and mutual exclusivity, enabling a demarcation 
of it from other organisms (Cracraft, 1987; Kornet, 
1993). Third, there needs to be irreducibility, such 
that the entity cannot further be divided and there-
fore forms a basal unit of taxonomy (Cracraft, 1987), 
with sub species used as recognisable cryptic forms 
of a species complex and not basal taxonomic units 
in themselves (Maxwell & Dekkers, 2019). Finally, 
the species must offer a level of recognisable com-
parability to allow for systematic evaluation and the 
discernment of evolutionary history (Cracraft, 1987). 
The individuali sation of a species can be problematic, 
particularly at the boundaries where the descriptive 
essences chosen to create the definition stray from 
the kind, obscuring the recognisable compatibility 
needed to generate a phylogeny. However, taxonomic 
realism can be achieved only when the taxonomist 
rejects limit ing the definition of species by adherence 
to dogma and accepts that nature does not differen-
tiate itself by a single unique classificatory unit or 
set of definitions inherent to a particular species 
concept (Ruse, 1998). Therefore, species-as-taxon 
are indi viduals formed out of a class consisting of 
a population, reflecting the reality that species are a 
taxonomic concept and not a category (Wiley, 1980). 
The need to adhere rigidly to a single concept, and 
the ideology that once a species has been defined it 
is immutable, can hinder the greater understanding of 
the natural world (Knapp, 2008; Lugadha et al., 2018). 
There is a long historical acceptance that no single 
concept best encapsulates the idea of species, and 
that there is a need to utilise the way that is optimised 
to achieve comprehensibility and usefulness for the 
 species to which the applied concept gives rise (Grout, 
1938). Therefore, the approach to defining a species 
and its operation must, as a priority, grant the wider 
community outside the realm of semantic taxonomy 
a greater understanding of nature (Cracraft, 1987). 
Each of the monist species concepts relies on a single 
universal level of evolutionary units, but each is fun-
damentally unable to account for the diversity between 
organisms (Mishler & Donaghue, 1982; Rosindell 
et al., 2010; Alitto et al., 2019). It is only with a broad 
pluralist approach to the idea of species as the collec-
tive individual that evolutionary relationships can be 
explained taxonomically (Matos-Marví et al., 2019).
Dealing with subspecies is problematic, and this 
is reflected in the lack of reference to them in the 
 conceptional literature. This is in part a consequence 
of the definition given to these lower taxonomic ranks 
such as temporarily isolated populations that are arbi-
trarily delimited and fated to reticulate back within 
other lineages (Frost & Kluge, 1994). However, the 
problem arises when the taxonomist is faced with 
making a subjective decision on whether a population 
is an arbitrary subspecies or a distinctive allopatric 
population with a distinctive evolutionary trajectory 
(Frost & Kluge, 1994). This leads to the argument that 
subspecies are not objective concepts (Groves, 2012). 
Maxwell & Dekkers (2019) argue that subspecies 
should be restricted to cryptic species where there are 
no physically observable boundaries to distinguish 
between populations; and that where boundaries are 
observable, species rank is justified. 
The elevation of subspecies to full species rank-
ing and the redrawing of existing phylogenies have 
consequences for the allocation of great reputa-
tional capital. This has a direct impact on all fields 
of biology, particularly the highly politicised fields of 
ecology and conservation biology (Tan et al., 2008; 
Frankham et al., 2012; Hey et al., 2003). Therefore, 
the arguments on the treatment of subspecies are 
even more controversial than debates over any singu-
lar particular species concept, which is why it is so 
often omitted from species debates. Notwithstanding, 
species are terminal in nature; thus, a taxonomically 
defined organism is a species, as it has taxonomical 
importance irrespective of conception (Maxwell & 
Dekkers, 2019).
HISTORICAL SPECIES CONCEPTUAL 
OVERVIEW
The number of species concepts that are in current use 
is a reflection of the treatment of the level of subtle 
distinctive phrasing that authors apply to a preferred 
concept; and its conceptual refinement is reflective 
of the lumping and splitting debates over species 
themselves (Groves, 2012; Mayden, 1999). The major 
conceptual frameworks proposed to delineate a 
species are each subdivided ad infinitum by indi-
vidual graduation and augmentation as taxonomists 
have sought theoretical ascendancy, and have been 
driven to find the one true universal species theory. 
Fundamentally, all historical species concepts fall 
into one of four categories:
1) morphological or phenetical (primarily 
ahistorical);
2) biological (attribute or mechanism);
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3) historical (common descent as the primary 
delineating factor); and
4) genetic, where nature is viewed as continuous 
and not discrete (Wheeler, 2007).
Phenetist- or morphological-based species con-
cepts are those in which physical characters are 
utilised to formulate the fundamental division or class 
that is used to generate a species. This is fundamen-
tally a classical approach in which there is an innate 
essence that distinguishes the organism (Mayr, 1987). 
Phenetic methodologies can be divided into two 
schools: Typological or Linnaean Species Concepts; 
and Morphological or Diagnostic Species Concepts.
The biological methodologies all have, at their 
core, a determination of species based on fitness and 
inheritance. The argument may be couched in terms of 
current or future biological isolation, depending on the 
methodological approach taken, or the  current selective 
benefits a cline may have to its current environment. 
However, a considerable failure of the biological 
 species methodologies is the need for the redefining 
of many of the currently accepted species, lumping of 
reticulating populations, and the application of these 
concepts to asexual biota (Hausdorf, 2011). There 
are four principal schools of biological specia tion: 
Biological or Mixological Species Concepts; Behavi-
oural or Recognition Species Concepts; Ecological 
or Differential Fitness Species Concepts; and Geo-
graphical Species Concepts.
The historical species concepts are based on 
 cladistic analyses. They use cladistic tree divisions 
and are grounded in cleavage in the lineage of an 
organism, which can be traced, providing a tempo-
ral aspect to the definition (Hennig, 1965; Kornet, 
1993). Historical concepts can be divided into two 
approaches, one in which the continuity is the funda-
mental driver of differentiation; and the other in which 
the recognition of distinctness predominates. The dis-
tinctness of the species as individual in the historical 
context is conceptualised in fundamental ways such 
as morphologically differentiable, adaptively dis-
tinct, geologically isolated, or tokogenetically isolated 
(Mishler & Donoghue, 1982). However, even more fun-
damental is the decrement of species from a delimiting 
point of divergence; and whether the original species 
is said to continue or is extinguished in the diver-
gence event (Miller, 2001). A secondary fundamental 
issue for all historical methodologies concerns the 
treatment of reticulation among organisms; this gives 
rise to many of the symptomatic issues concerning 
biological concepts (Hausdorf, 2011). There are four 
primary schools of historical speciation: Evolutionary 
or Unified Species Concepts; Hennigian General 
Lin e age Species Concepts; Historical Continuity 
or Purist Phylogenetic Species Concepts; Historical 
Toko genesis Species Concepts; and Phylogenetic or 
Historical Semphorantry Species Concepts.
Dissimilarity models have an ideology that  species 
should be considered in terms of the smallest delinea-
tion, a mereological approach to the delineation of 
entities based on similarities contained within the 
DNA, that has given rise to a plethora of physically 
indistinguishable cryptic species that should be treated 
as subspecies (Baker and Bradley, 2006; Mishler & 
Donaghue, 1982; Stauffer-Olsen et al., 2019; Maxwell 
& Dekkers, 2019). Ahistorical species concepts seek 
to find processes of speciation that differentiate sets 
of organisms. Notwithstanding the approach mode to 
the species concept, there is an underlying commona-
lity (intrinsic essence) based on a shared analogy and 
parallel evolution that creates a fundamental natural 
kind, which is delineated and classifiable (Hull, 1987). 
There are four principal schools of speciation based 
on genetic dissimilarity: Structural Species Con-
cepts; Genetic or Genic Species Concepts; Co hesion 
or Continuous Stochastic Block Model Species Con-
cepts; and Genotypic or Functional Clustering Species 
Concepts.
THE COMPLEXITY OF DEMARCATION
One of the challenges facing taxonomists is the deter-
mination of the level of difference that is considered 
significant enough to warrant the demarcation of 
a species from its sister taxa (Adams, 1998; Schutze 
et al., 2017). The adherence to a particular species 
concept limits the potential for the naming of new 
species (de Meeûs et al., 2003; Schlick-Steiner et al., 
2010; Pante et al., 2015). Key to the determination of 
what constitutes a species is the understanding of the 
evolutionary trajectory of an organism and the level 
of reticulation with sister taxa that they may undergo 
(Adams, 1998; de Queiroz, 2005). However, the deter-
mination of future evolutionary trajectories is fraught 
with the danger of speculation and is often under-
taken with a level of subjective evidence of directional 
change based on comparative phylogeny (Adams, 
1998). There is now almost universal consensus that, 
irrespective of the choice of species concept chosen 
by the taxonomist, it is the demarcation of a distinc-
tive evolutionary trajectory that unifies all concepts 
(de Queiroz, 2007).
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The construction of phylogeny and the determina-
tion of species are often based on the sampling of taxa 
from an existing preconceived pool of organisms. 
These pools are derived from taxonomic assumptions 
that are based on existing notions of what species 
exist, and characters are drawn from a checklist of 
that group (Barraclough & Nee, 2001). This invari-
ably opens the process of phylogenetic reconstruction 
to be based in the existing taxonomy, and invariably 
leads to the confounding and completely arbitrary 
splitting-lumping conundrum (Barraclough & Nee, 
2001). The taxonomist seeks out the patterns of recur-
rence in nature and then makes the internal judgement 
of the significance of that pattern (Hey, 2001). 
Whether species are lumped together, or the level of 
variation is significant to enable the distinguishing 
of separate entities, it is conducted at the subjective 
judgement of the taxonomist and the weighting given 
to differing characteristics they determine to be con-
sequential (Casanova, 2013). The approach taken in 
the deter mination of consequential characteristics is 
often biased by the discipline or taxonomic group 
with which the taxonomist is working and their 
requirement for taxonomic indicators (Kunz, 2002; 
Frankham et al., 2012). This invariably leads to a set 
of conditions, or criteria, that are used to generate 
the concept that is applied in the species diagnosis, 
often to the exclusion of all other species concepts. 
If species are comprised of multiple populations that 
are spatio-temporally separated with individual des-
tinies either to reticulate, speciate or go extinct, then 
it is clear that there is no one conceptualised force 
that explains all the potentialities of divergence. Con-
sequently, no one single species concept is able to 
encapsulate the entirety of the collective essences of 
the amalgamated organism clade to meet the needs 
of the taxonomic masses (Haveman, 2013).
One major failing with a hypothetical species is 
that the historical clustering of organisms that can be 
well defined and used to generate the spatio-temporal 
point at which a species is delimited creates the prob-
lem of omitting transitional forms (Girard & Renaud, 
2011). Similarly, populations may be heterospecific 
and may be part of more than one species by defini-
tion (González-Forero, 2009). Heterospecificity is one 
of the major problems when demarcating the boun-
daries of agamic groups and is a primary reason that 
most species concepts omit an argument on  asexuality 
(Hausdorf, 2011; Haveman, 2013).
Discrete discernment of kinds, which are sound in 
their spatio-temporal position and are not  singularly 
based upon particular apomorphs, will give rise to 
the collective individual and offer basal soundness 
to any clade (Baum & Donoghue, 1995; de Queiroz 
& Gauthier, 1994). The monist argument that plural-
ism leads to confusion through a lack of intrinsic 
meaning in the term ‘species’ can be overcome when 
the taxon omist is explicit in the method and concep-
tionality (Schlick-Steiner et al., 2010). The use of 
essentialistic pluralism delineates a set of organisms 
from the natural world at a particular spatio-temporal 
point and that contains enough meaning to enable 
discrimination and thus allow for an organism’s taxo-
nomic discernment. It is the failing of hierarchical 
taxonomic theory that, even if kinds are well defined, 
there remains a distinct lack of evolutionary theory in 
the relationships between higher taxa.
REVIEWING PLURALISM
The essentialistic pluralist approach does not seek to 
tie the taxonomist down to one species concept, but 
rather enables a choice in definition to be applied 
based on the uniqueness of the characteristics of the 
organism as a set, and thus is an extension of the 
 reality that taxa are entities that currently exist, or have 
existed, within a temporal space and are in need of 
demarcation and explanation (Kitcher, 1984, 1984a). 
This is the theoretical underpinning for integrative 
taxonomic practice with its universality in choice of 
criteria with maximum defensibility of demarcation 
(Yeates et al., 2011; Schutze et al., 2017), but further 
adds a spatio-temporal constraint. This temporalism 
must still include innate references to the organ-
isms that are historically related, as the removal of 
the historical context itself reduces the meaning of 
 species and is a major cause of inconsistency, even in 
the face of disconnectivity of lineages (Ereshefsky, 
1992). Ereshefsky (1992) noted that pluralistic  species 
concepts allow for the coverage of the multiplicity 
of evolutionary forces that drive divergences, such 
as interbreeding, selection, genetic homoeostasis, 
 common descent, and developmental and ecological 
isolation: this conceptional approach formed the basis 
for integrated taxonomy (Schlick-Steiner et al., 2010; 
Pante et al., 2015; Solari et al., 2019). This reflects the 
reality of the natural world. Mayr (1987, p. 149) argues 
that the pluralist approach failed through the in ability 
to distinguish the species category and the species 
organism: “mammals, hairy caterpillars, hairy seeds 
of certain plants and other hairy objects, would make a 
legitimate set” and therefore a heterogeneous species. 
Mayr (1987) fails to recognise that pluralist species are 
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discrete individuals, a collective set bounded in time, 
having a real meaning used to describe the observ-
able and not categorical abstractions. True pluralism 
needs to be free from any structural boundaries and 
overcomes the underlying complexities of the species 
argument to enable a taxonomist to enunciate a greater 
accuracy in the phylogenetic classificatory process. 
This is achieved through the enabling of individuality 
through the recognition of set complexity (Lombard 
et al., 2010).
Mishler & Donaghue (1982) argue that species 
should not be separated from higher ranks, but form 
a natural extension of them; and should be viewed 
as assemblages united by descent, not as individuals. 
However, the acceptance of individuality enables the 
taxonomist to draw a spatiotemporal line as to the 
kinds that are to be used in classification. These kinds 
then enable the understanding of higher ranks based 
on evolutionary relationships. Not accepting species as 
individuals means that the basis of higher  taxonomy 
is grounded in arbitrariness and thus rendered mean-
ingless. The term ‘exclusivity’ can be associated with 
kinds and is the foundation of the coalescence theory, 
that biological entities are closely related to a particu-
lar group and thus objectively discernible (Baum & 
Donoghue, 1995).
Mayden (1999) conceived the consistent approach 
of species delimitation, in which there was an encour-
agement of cooperation in the understanding of 
diversity and for conceptual monism. At the heart of 
this monist approach is the recognition of the species 
based on a description or diagnosis that is used as 
the criterion for demarcation, which is then defined 
by a concept (Mayden, 1999). However, one universal 
failure of species concepts is the lack of conceptual 
definition, which should be resolved before the popu-
lation can be determined (Hausdorf, 2011). This is 
probably more relevant to species delineation than 
any conceptual approach. Hey (2006, p. 459) argued 
that “detection protocols are not concepts” and the 
taxonomist needs to separate the criteria for delineat-
ing species from the “theoretical understanding of 
the way species exist”, that is, the concept. This idea 
places the recognition of a species outside the con-
fines of any preconception of how a species should 
be conceptualised. There is a need for species plural-
ism, which is the overarching monist concept, and has 
been the underlying goal of all species conceptual 
arguments.
A fundamental pluralistic approach seeks to bring 
an overarching conceptuality to the differing species 
concepts in which the goal was not an abandonment of 
any one concept per se, but rather an acceptance that 
each concept is an operational tool to be used in the 
discovery of the species (Mayden, 1999). The deter-
mination of the evolutionary trajectory has  priority in 
species demarcation, and the species concept applied 
is merely the tool to enable recognition of that evolu-
tionary event at a point in time. 
One of the major issues that distinguishes species 
concepts is the determination of whether the process 
of evolutionary separation has been finalised, or is 
an on-going process marked with a lack of complete 
biological separation of the populations. There is a 
growing shift to accept species as evolutionary popu-
lations and a realisation that criteria for delimiting 
these species cannot be restricted, but rather need to 
be based on factors that are outside the confines of 
any one isolating biological property (Naomi, 2011). 
That is, under essentialist pluralism, the taxonomist 
may be aware of an essential characteristic that makes 
a species unusual and distinctive. This then forms the 
basis for a criterion, and integrated taxonomy allows 
the taxonomist to be free to determine a conceptual 
approach that provides the framework for naming 
a new taxon based on that distinctiveness. Therefore, 
under essentialist pluralism, there is no restriction 
on which concept is used to delineate an organism. 
However, there is a need to restrict the species to 
a point in time with a defined morphospace. Thus, this 
conceptual freedom demands that taxonomists accept 
an obligation to be true to the phylogeny and thus 
must justify the choice of species concept, both in 
terms of a criterion for distinction, as well as offering 
an explanation for the cause of that species’ existence, 
as well as stating its relationships with others placing 
the organism in context.
PHILOSOPHICAL FAILINGS
Many of the reviews of species concepts fail to 
explore essentialist arguments, or when this explora-
tion is carried out, it is with the basic premise that all 
essentialist arguments are phenetic. However, one of 
the major failings of the current essentialist approach 
to species criteria is the decision that  species con-
cepts are facts and, therefore, acceptable to be used 
taxonomically (Hey, 2006). This clearly is the crux 
of the problem. Taxonomists fail to recognise that 
 species have two parts: the criteria with the distinctive 
hypothetical process of species delimitation with the 
rigidity to a concept; and the conception itself, which 
is hypothetical (Paul, 2002). The natural consequence 
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of failing to recognise these two parts explains why 
the treatment of complex taxonomic clusters, such as 
agamics, is overlooked in conceptual formulations. 
It is only with integrated taxonomy that the taxon-
omist is freed from the theoretical constraints of 
taxonomic rigidity imposed by doctrinal adherence 
to a single hypothetical species concept and is able 
to explore the criteria of the real organism neces sary 
to impart taxonomic meaning (Schlick-Steiner et al., 
2010). Essentialistic pluralism, through the use of 
integrated taxonomic practice, provides an explicit 
spatio-temporal point necessary to impart taxonomic 
meaning; and therefore, provide reference points 
for evolutionary contextualisation as an organism 
morphs through time. 
Fundamentally, species need to be conceptualised 
outside of taxonomic classificatory systems as they fall 
outside of systematic hierarchical arguments (Dubois, 
2011). Thus, the use of subspecies is arbitrary, with 
all-natural entities worthy of species consideration 
if they are observably distinguishable, even if this is 
only spatially significant (Maxwell & Dekkers, 2019). 
This is because species, although hypothetically 
 chosen, remain real entities, represented by collective 
individual populations and not just intentional mean-
ings derived by the taxonomist, which is inherently 
what higher classifications are (Ghiselin, 1974; Hull, 
1976). This raises a point of contention: if species are 
real, why are many of the concepts that are used to 
define them based on unreal or non-causal criteria? 
This leads to a complexity in conceptual realisation 
and invariably to conceptual misunderstanding, a 
problem absent in higher taxonomic arguments that 
have no physical reality or place in species debates 
(Stamos, 2003).
IMPLICATIONS FOR DISCERNING SPECIES
Recent evolutionary essentialism has, at its core, a 
sense of indeterminacy in the definition of what consti-
tutes a species (Devitt, 2010). This indeter minacy can 
be countered if a species is first viewed as an indivi-
dually unified population representing hypotheses that 
explain the convergence of both intrinsic and extrinsic 
structural essences. The acceptance of essences as hav-
ing intrinsic and extrinsic properties highlights one of 
the theoretical failings of the current anti- essentialism 
debate, where species are delineated primarily on 
intrinsically pseudo-phenetically inclined parameters 
(Lewens, 2012). The intrinsic and extrinsic structural 
essences of collective higher taxa particular to a clade 
are used to form a continuum, the essence matrix, 
from which the organism state is then delineated. This 
organism state represents a static cross-section in the 
evolutionary history of a real population that contains 
all the phylogenetically restricted character essences 
that are exhibited by the organism and allows for group 
delineation (Pleijel & Rouse, 2000; Figure 2).
The evolutionary progression of the organism 
is phylogenetically constrained by the evolving and 
limiting structural essences. This idea of struc-
tural essences forming a unified entity is in the 
true Aristotelian tradition (Dumsday, 2012). Not-
withstanding, the concept of phylogeny generated by 
the new evolutionary synthesis necessitates that these 
structural essences are viewed as spatio- temporally 
mutable. Therefore, structural essences are to be 
seen as historical and, possibly, variably pluralistic in 
nature, and in turn they reference the wider immut-
able spatio-temporal.
CONCLUSION
The reliance on species relational concepts without 
an evolutionary context, and the linking of phenetic 
 ideology with the concept of essence, is a failing in 
much of current essentialist and anti-essentialist argu-
ments (Lewens, 2012). It is only the understanding of 
the structural essence itself, with knowledge of the 
driving forces and processes that gave rise to that 
essence, which enables the discernment of analogies 
and reveals the true phylogenesis of an organism. It is 
how the cladist or taxonomist deals with the deline-
ation of stages in the evolutionary progression of 
structural essences that then forms the basis of the 
restriction of the organism state and how the kind 
is defined. This is then consequently reflected in the 
 criteria used in the choice of model of speciation and 
conception that is utilised to impart taxonomic mean-
ing to all hypothetical entities called a species.
Once the taxonomist has distinguished the evo-
lutionary trajectory of an organism based on any 
criterion, there is freedom to determine an appropri-
ate conceptual approach to justify the recognition of 
the new species. The only requirement that is placed 
on the taxonomist is the need for explicitness in the 
justification for that conceptual choice. Essentialistic 
pluralism generates hypothetical terminal taxonomic 
units from which phylogenies are then constructed. 
Therefore, delimitation of species has a critical impact 
on the understanding of evolutionary biology where 
they form the spatio-temporal kind within an essence 
matrix, the continuum of evolutionary descent. The 
use of essentialistic pluralism, with its unrestricted 
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approach to conceptualisation of what is a species, 
using integrated taxonomy with spatio-temporal limi-
tations, allows the taxonomist the freedom to express 
a unique approach to exploring phylogeny without 
the shackles of rigid necessity to declare adherence 
to a single species concept. Essentialist pluralism is, 
therefore, the gold standard for universality and is the 
conceptual monist Holy Grail that has underpinned 
the rhetoric of species debates for centuries. It is only 
the fear of loss of reputational capital by taxonomists 
who have spent their lives arguing for one concept 
that implicitly holds integrated taxonomy back from 
achieving universal acceptance.
The conceptual monist argument that pluralism 
leads to confusion through a lack of intrinsic meaning 
in the term ‘species’ can be overcome when the taxo-
nomist is explicit. The use of essentialist pluralism 
delineates a set of organisms from the natural world 
that contains enough meaning to enable discrimi-
nation and thus allow for an organism’s taxonomic 
discernment. It is the failing of hierarchical taxono-
mic theory that, even if kinds are well defined, there 
remains a distinct lack of evolutionary theory or the 
concept that the describing author had for the relation-
ships between higher taxa. Therefore, essentialistic 
pluralism addresses the issue of species demarcation 
at its core. Once the taxonomist has distinguished the 
evolutionary trajectory of an organism based on any 
criterion, there is freedom to determine an appropriate 
conceptual approach to justify the recognition of the 
new species. The only requirement that is placed on 
the taxonomist is the need for explicitness in the jus-
tification for that conceptual choice. This invariably 
makes sub-specific ranks taxonomically meaningless, 
and invariably recognises all ranks below species as 
individual evolutionary lines worthy of full species 
FIGURE 2. The two fundamental essentialist ideologies: A) the phenetic approach, which does not include evolutionary 
progression; and B) the essential pluralist approach, in which structural essences are used to delineate an organism state with 
character essences in temporal stasiogenesis within the evolutionary continuum. Organisms may show similar structural 
essences (X) as a consequence of occupying the same position within the essence matrix, this may arise from a mechanism 
such as convergence. Each of the taxa that overlaps can be readily distinguished from the other through an understanding 
of their evolutionary progression. The essence matrix is the the evolutionary potential of an organism that confines the 
character limits. 
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recognition. That is, subspecies should be used for 
cryptic species and the examination of  clinal varia-
tions (Maxwell & Dekkers, 2019). This leads to an 
argument for the use of mononomial terminal tax-
onomy. Further, this new taxonomic approach to 
species conceptualisation has significant implica-
tions for the assignation of higher taxonomy, which 
is often more a reflection of the lack of ‘room’ at the 
lower cladistic levels under the draconian Linnaean 
rigid metho dology which is being challenged with 
the introduction of phylogenetic nomenclature under 
the PhlyoCode. Essentialistic pluralism and terminal 
taxonomy present a new approach to species and are 
natural extensions of using rank-free phylogenetic tax-
onomy in higher classification with spatio- temporal 
restrictions.
The Linnaean system is a set of informal hierarchies 
that simply groups organisms into clusters based on 
taxonomic preference, which are then named relative 
to each other without the need for historical considera-
tion of any higher relationship. This lack of relational 
meaning can be traced back to the fact that relational 
understanding of higher system atics fundamentally 
eluded Linné. The need to explain evolutionary trends 
has become an important facet in the modern evolu-
tionary synthesis, and such evolutionary processes and 
patterns need to be reflected in the nomenclature. This 
contextual ambiguity has left Linnaean taxonomy 
struggling to demonstrate true historical relationships 
between the taxa within clades. Therefore, there is a 
strategic need to revise the lower order taxonomy and 
in particular revisit the idea of uninomials to avoid 
arbitrary cladistics rankings. 
Essentialistic pluralism addresses the issue of 
species demarcation at its core. Once the taxonomist 
has distinguished the evolutionary trajectory of an 
organism based on any criterion, there is freedom 
to determine an appropriate conceptual approach to 
justify the recognition of the new species. The only 
requirement that is placed on the taxonomist is the 
need for explicitness in the justification for that con-
ceptual choice. This invariably makes sub-specific 
ranks taxonomically meaningless and recognises all 
ranks below species as individual evolutionary lines 
worthy of full species recognition. This leads to an 
argument for the use of terminal taxonomy to be 
declared to anchor all levels of nomenclature. Further, 
this new taxonomic approach to species conceptuali-
sation has significant implications for the assignation 
of higher taxonomy, which is often more a reflec-
tion of the lack of ‘room’ at the lower cladistic levels 
under the draconian Linnaean rigid methodology. 
Essentialistic pluralism and terminal taxonomy com-
bined present a new approach to species, and this is a 
natural consequence of using rank-free phylogenetic 
taxonomy in higher classification.
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